In the most thorough examination to date, David P. Currie analyzes from a legal perspective the work of the first six congresses and of the executive branch during the Federalist era, with a view to its significance for constitutional interpretation. He concludes that the original understanding of the Constitution was forged not so much in the courts as in the legislative and executive branches.

Judicial review has enjoyed such success in the United States that we tend to forget that other branches of government also play a role in interpreting the Constitution. Before 1800, however, nearly all our constitutional law was made by Congress or the president, and so was much of it thereafter.

Indeed a number of constitutional issues of the first importance have never been resolved by judges; what we know of their solution we owe to the legislative and executive branches, whose interpretations have established traditions almost as hallowed in some cases as the Constitution itself.

The first half of this volume is devoted to the critical work of the First Congress, which was in many ways a continuation of the Constitutional Convention. In addition to setting up executive departments, federal courts, and a national bank, the First Congress imposed the first federal taxes, regulated foreign commerce, and enacted laws respecting naturalization, copyrights and patents, and federal crimes. In so doing it debated a myriad of fundamental questions about the scope and limits of its powers.

Thus the First Congress left us a rich legacy of arguments over the meaning of a variety of constitutional provisions, and the quality of those arguments was impressively high.

Part Two treats the Second through Sixth Congresses, where members of the legislative and executive branches continued to debate constitutional questions great and small. In addition to such familiar controversies as the Neutrality Proclamation, the Jay Treaty, and the Alien and Sedition Acts, this part traces the difficult constitutional issues that arose when Congress confronted the problems of presidential succession, legislative reapportionment, and the scope of the impeachment power.

Proposals to provide relief to New England fishermen, Caribbean refugees, and the victims of a Georgia fire all helped to define the limits of Congress's power to spend. And the period ended with a burst of fireworks as Federalist congressmen concocted schemes of doubtful constitutionality in an effort to deny their defeat at the polls. Constitutional debates over some of these controversial matters tended to be highly partisan.

On the whole, however, Currie argues that both Congress and the presidents during this period did their best to determine what the Constitution meant and displayed a commendable sensitivity to the demands of federalism and the separation of powers. Like its predecessors in Currie's ongoing study of the Constitution's evolution, this book will prove indispensable for scholars in constitutional law, history, and government.