Signaling Goodness
Social Rules and Public Choice (Economics, Cognition, and Society)
by Phillip J. Nelson and Kenneth V. Greene
"As alternative explanations of public choice, neither narrow self-interest nor altruism works because of the free-rider problem involved in large group decisions. Signaling Goodness develops an alternative explanation - the theory of asymmetric "goodness" - that successfully predicts both political behavior as well as the behavior of charity, the traditional bastion of altruistic theorizing. The authors show, for example, that the main conflicting motivation is also a reputational return - imitating the behavior of one's close friends and associates to signal trustworthiness to them. They find that those who have the greatest returns to imitation are those least likely to use "goodness" signaling."--BOOK JACKET.
Check nearby libraries
Buy this book
Previews available in: English
Showing 1 featured edition. View all 1 editions?
| Edition | Availability |
|---|---|
1
Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice (Economics, Cognition, and Society)
October 23, 2003, University of Michigan Press
Hardcover
in English
047211347X 9780472113477
|
aaaa
Libraries near you:
WorldCat
|
Book Details
Classifications
The Physical Object
ID Numbers
Community Reviews (0)
Feedback?
| October 5, 2024 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| February 25, 2022 | Edited by ImportBot | import existing book |
| August 19, 2021 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| July 7, 2019 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| July 29, 2014 | Created by ImportBot | import new book |