Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap
the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank
by Olivier Jeanne
"An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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| Edition | Availability |
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Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap: the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap: the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank
2004, International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 5 revisions
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| December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| August 4, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] :' to 'Electronic resource' |
| December 12, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| October 31, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | add URIs from original MARC record |
| April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |