Cover of: The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth | Gar Alperovitz
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November 20, 2020 | History

The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth

1st ed.
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This edition was published in by Knopf in New York.

Written in English

847 pages

One of the most controversial issues absorbing America today: Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Fifty years after the fateful summer of 1945, we are still debating Harry Truman's decision. Now, in an exhaustive, thoroughly documented study of the events of that time, Gar Alperovitz makes plain why the United States did not need to deploy the bomb, how Truman was advised of alternatives to it by nearly every civilian and military adviser, and how his final decision was later justified by what amounted to a deception - the claim that the action saved half a million to a million American soldiers who might otherwise have died in an invasion. Alperovitz demonstrates that Japan was close to surrender, that it was profoundly threatened by the prospect of Soviet entry into the war, and that American leaders knew the end was near. Military commanders like Eisenhower, Arnold, and Leahy saw no need to use the bomb; most of Truman's key Cabinet members urged a clarification of the position of Japan's Emperor to speed surrender. But the inexperienced president listened most intently to his incoming secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, and Byrnes was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets.

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth
1998, DIANE Publishing Company
in English
Cover of: The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth
The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth
1995, Knopf
in English - 1st ed.

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The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth

First published in 1995



Work Description

One of the most controversial issues absorbing America today: Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Fifty years after the fateful summer of 1945, we are still debating Harry Truman's decision. Now, in an exhaustive, thoroughly documented study of the events of that time, Gar Alperovitz makes plain why the United States did not need to deploy the bomb, how Truman was advised of alternatives to it by nearly every civilian and military adviser, and how his final decision was later justified by what amounted to a deception - the claim that the action saved half a million to a million American soldiers who might otherwise have died in an invasion. Alperovitz demonstrates that Japan was close to surrender, that it was profoundly threatened by the prospect of Soviet entry into the war, and that American leaders knew the end was near. Military commanders like Eisenhower, Arnold, and Leahy saw no need to use the bomb; most of Truman's key Cabinet members urged a clarification of the position of Japan's Emperor to speed surrender. But the inexperienced president listened most intently to his incoming secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, and Byrnes was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets.

Classifications

Library of Congress D769.2 .A5 1995
Dewey 940.54/25

The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth

1st ed.

This edition was published in by Knopf in New York.


Edition Description

One of the most controversial issues absorbing America today: Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Fifty years after the fateful summer of 1945, we are still debating Harry Truman's decision. Now, in an exhaustive, thoroughly documented study of the events of that time, Gar Alperovitz makes plain why the United States did not need to deploy the bomb, how Truman was advised of alternatives to it by nearly every civilian and military adviser, and how his final decision was later justified by what amounted to a deception - the claim that the action saved half a million to a million American soldiers who might otherwise have died in an invasion. Alperovitz demonstrates that Japan was close to surrender, that it was profoundly threatened by the prospect of Soviet entry into the war, and that American leaders knew the end was near. Military commanders like Eisenhower, Arnold, and Leahy saw no need to use the bomb; most of Truman's key Cabinet members urged a clarification of the position of Japan's Emperor to speed surrender. But the inexperienced president listened most intently to his incoming secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, and Byrnes was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets.

Table of Contents

The decision
Unconditional surrender
Russian option
Atomic diplomacy - James F. Byrnes
Potsdam
"Military necessity"
Endgame
Myth
Henry L. Stimson
President Harry S. Truman
James F. Byrnes
Managing history.

Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references (p. [785]-811) and index.

Classifications

Dewey Decimal Class
940.54/25
Library of Congress
D769.2 .A5 1995

The Physical Object

Pagination
xiv, 847 p. ;
Number of pages
847

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL1277103M
Internet Archive
decisiontouseato00alpe
ISBN 10
0679443312
ISBN 13
9780679443315
LC Control Number
95008778
OCLC/WorldCat
32347917
Library Thing
645531
Goodreads
1753789

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