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In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Peru and Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery probability by 0.2-0.4 percentage points in Peru, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%; doubling household expenditure in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points compared to a bribery rate of 17%. The income elasticity of the bribe amount cannot be precisely estimated in Peru, but is about 0.37 in Uganda. Bribes in the Ugandan public sector appear to be fees-for-service extorted from the richer patients amongst those exempted by government policy from paying the official fees. Bribes in the private sector appear to be flat-rate fees paid by patients who do not pay official fees. I do not find evidence that the public health care sector in either Peru or Uganda is able to price-discriminate less effectively than public institutions with less competition from the private sector.
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Subjects
Bribery, Corrupt practices, Medical care, Public healthShowing 2 featured editions. View all 2 editions?
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Bribery in health care in peru and uganda
2007, National Bureau of Economic Research
electronic resource /
in English
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Edition Notes
"April 2007"
Includes bibliographical references (p. 17-19).
Also available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).
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Feedback?December 3, 2010 | Edited by Open Library Bot | Added subjects from MARC records. |
December 9, 2009 | Created by WorkBot | add works page |