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"The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem
2009, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/18/2009.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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Feedback?October 29, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
December 8, 2009 | Created by ImportBot | add works page |