Principals as agents

subjective performance measurement in education

Principals as agents
Brian Aaron Jacob, Brian Aaron ...
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Last edited by MARC Bot
December 13, 2020 | History

Principals as agents

subjective performance measurement in education

"In this paper, we compare subjective principal assessments of teachers to the traditional determinants of teacher compensation ŁV education and experience ŁV and another potential compensation mechanism -- value-added measures of teacher effectiveness based on student achievement gains. We find that subjective principal assessments of teachers predict future student achievement significantly better than teacher experience, education or actual compensation, though not as well as value-added teacher quality measures. In particular, principals appear quite good at identifying those teachers who produce the largest and smallest standardized achievement gains in their schools, but have far less ability to distinguish between teachers in the middle of this distribution and systematically discriminate against male and untenured faculty. Moreover, we find that a principalŁŒs overall rating of a teacher is a substantially better predictor of future parent requests for that teacher than either the teacherŁŒs experience, education and current compensation or the teacherŁŒs value-added achievement measure. These findings not only inform education policy, but also shed light on subjective performance assessment more generally"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Publish Date
Language
English

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Principals as agents
Principals as agents: subjective performance measurement in education
2005, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
Cover of: Principals as agents
Principals as agents: subjective performance measurement in education
2005, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/6/2005.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Cambridge, MA
Series
NBER working paper series -- working paper 11463, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 11463.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

Edition Identifiers

Open Library
OL23672951M
LCCN
2005618356

Work Identifiers

Work ID
OL5893312W

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December 13, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
May 1, 2010 Edited by WorkBot merge works
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