In Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Literary Experience, James Guetti makes extensive use of the philosopher's conception of "logical grammar" to address such key problems of literary theory as intention, voice, figurative language, and the question of a basic difference between "ordinary" and literary usage. Although the philosophy of Wittgenstein was not directed primarily at literary or aesthetic problems, Guetti notes, certain of his ideas about language can be directly applied to such problems. Guetti focuses especially on Wittgenstein's fundamental proposition that the meaning of language is in its use - purposive use to some end - and on the distinction Wittgenstein makes between "working" and "idling" language. Guetti uses this distinction to argue that certain literary effects should not be confused with meanings. He also examines Wittgenstein's concept that "grammatical form" is something that expressions may display in varying, and not necessarily meaningful, ways. If we regard various literary forms as "grammatical displays," Guetti maintains, we can place their particular dynamics in a new light and understand better the compelling ways in which language engages human beings apart from its "meaningfulness." Guetti's positions thus contain what amounts to a strong counterargument to the Derridean notion of the "play of signification," simply by demonstrating that this "play" is grammatical and not a matter of meaning. Although his work is not a direct attack on deconstruction, Guetti establishes - with reference to a variety of literary texts and to Wittgenstein's philosophy - a conceptual system that can be used to challenge both that theoretical approach and others that may misrepresent literary forms.