This is the first study of Civil War command since Douglas Southall Freeman's Lee's Lieutenants (1944) that has focused solely and directly with the problems and methods of operational command; in so doing, the author has dealt with the tactical and strategical problems that threatened to overwhelm untried Civil War generals at the very onset of hostilities.

The failure of antebellum American military thought to come to grips with outdated linear tactics and inapplicable strategic principles resulted in commanders on both sides in the Civil War having to lead mass armies of untried civilian soldiers into a war for which neither the led nor the leader had been prepared to fight. Higher level commanders on both sides were forced to create and develop a personal art of command while actually putting it into practice on campaign and on the battlefield.

In so doing - however well or badly managed - the typical commanders under observation developed a pragmatic art that has left a legacy that still provides paradigms for military leaders in the late 20th century.