Coercive Power in Social Exchange describes the progression and results of a decade-long program of experimental research on power in social exchange relations. Exchange theorists have traditionally excluded punishment and coercion from the scope of their analyses; Molm examines whether exchange theory can be expanded to include both reward and coercive power.

Working within the framework of Emerson's power-dependence theory, but also drawing on the decision theory concepts of strategic action and loss aversion, Molm develops and tests a theory of coercion in social exchange that emphasizes the interdependence of these two bases of power. Her work shows that reward power and coercive power are fundamentally different, not only in their effects on behavior but also in the structural incentive to use power and the risks of power use.

When exchanges are nonnegotiated and secured by the "shadow of the future," rather than by binding agreements, dependence both encourages and constrains the use of coercion.