Since he was in charge of the amphibious operations in the Falklands War of 1982, it goes without saying that there is no one better qualified to tell the story of that aspect of the campaign than Commodore Michael Clapp. In answer to the obvious question, 'Why has it taken him nearly fourteen years to give his account of the vital role he played?' the answer will soon become apparent.

Here he describes, with considerable candour, some of the problems met in a Navy racing to war and finding it necessary to recreate a largely abandoned operational technique in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. During the time it took to 'go south' some sense of order was imposed and a not very well defined command structure evolved. As Michael Clapp reveals, this was not done without generating a certain amount of friction.

Here also is told how San Carlos Water was chosen for the assault and subsequent inshore operations. Michael Clapp and his small staff made their stand and can claim a major role in the defeat of the Argentine Air and Land Forces.

Some of the facts revealed in this book will come as a surprise to many, both among those who 'went south' and among the armchair historians who think they know exactly what occurred. But Michael Clapp, aided by Ewen Southby-Tailyour and a mass of information given to them, has much to add to what has hitherto been told.