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"In this comprehensive study, Randolph Clarke examines libertarian accounts. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, he defends a type of event-causal view - one on which a free action must be non-deterministically caused by its immediate causal antecedents - from the charges concerning rationality and diminished control.
Clarke subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. He then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and non-deterministic event causation."
"Clarke defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. He concludes that if a broad thesis of compatibilism is correct - one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism - then no libertarian account is entirely adequate."--Jacket.
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Free will and determinismShowing 3 featured editions. View all 3 editions?
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1
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
March 22, 2006, Oxford University Press, USA
in English
0195306422 9780195306422
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2
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
2003, Oxford University Press, Incorporated
in English
019803623X 9780198036234
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3
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
September 16, 2003, Oxford University Press, USA
in English
019515987X 9780195159875
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