Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
by Pravin Krishna
"This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Commercial policy, Free trade| Edition | Availability |
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1
Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
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Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/6/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 5 revisions
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| July 31, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
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