Market distortions when agents are better informed

the value of information in real estate transactions

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Market distortions when agents are better inf ...
Steven D. Levitt
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Last edited by WorkBot
December 15, 2009 | History

Market distortions when agents are better informed

the value of information in real estate transactions

  • 0 Ratings
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"Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example. Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home. In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter case, the agent wants to pursue the first-best. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3.7 percent more than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer, even after controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics. Situations in which the agent's informational advantage is larger lead to even greater distortions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
21

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"January 2005."

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).

Published in
Cambridge, Mass
Series
NBER working paper series -- no. 11053., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11053.

The Physical Object

Pagination
21, [12] p. ;
Number of pages
21

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL17625742M
OCLC/WorldCat
57655359

Source records

Oregon Libraries MARC record

Work Description

"Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example. Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home. In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter case, the agent wants to pursue the first-best. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3.7 percent more than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer, even after controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics. Situations in which the agent's informational advantage is larger lead to even greater distortions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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History

Download catalog record: RDF / JSON / OPDS | Wikipedia citation
December 15, 2009 Edited by WorkBot link works
April 25, 2009 Edited by ImportBot add OCLC number
September 29, 2008 Created by ImportBot Imported from Oregon Libraries MARC record