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"This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subjects
Commercial policy, Free tradeEdition | Availability |
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1
Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
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Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
"October 2004."
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).
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- Created September 29, 2008
- 3 revisions
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December 15, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
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