An edition of Transaction costs (2004)

Transaction costs

valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly bargaining, and third-party effects in water rights exchanges : the Owens Valley transfer to Los Angeles

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Transaction costs
Gary D. Libecap, Gary D. Libec ...
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Last edited by MARC Bot
December 13, 2020 | History
An edition of Transaction costs (2004)

Transaction costs

valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly bargaining, and third-party effects in water rights exchanges : the Owens Valley transfer to Los Angeles

  • 1 Want to read

"Between 1905 and 1934 over 869 farmers in Owens Valley, California sold their land and associated water rights to Los Angeles, 250 miles to the southwest. This agriculture-to-urban water transfer increased Los Angeles' water supply by over 4 times, making the subsequent dramatic growth of the semi-arid city possible, generating large economic returns. The exchange took water from a marginal agricultural area and transferred it via the Los Angeles Aqueduct. No other sources of water became available for the city until 1941 with the arrival of water from Hoover Dam via the California Aqueduct. The Owens Valley transfer was the first and last, large-scale voluntary market exchange of water from agriculture to urban. Despite gains to both parties from the re-allocation of water to higher-valued uses, the Owens Valley transfer serves today as a metaphor, cautioning any agricultural region against water sales to urban areas. In this paper I examine the bargaining involved in the Owens Valley water transfer to determine why it was so contentious and became so notorious. I focus on valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly, and third party effects. I also examine the impact of the transfer on Owens Valley and Los Angeles land owners. The results suggest gains to both groups. Broader conclusions for bargaining, when the aggregate gains from trade are enormous, but distribution very skewed, are drawn"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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Language
English

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Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/10/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Cambridge, MA
Series
NBER working paper series ;, working paper 10801, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 10801.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL3475940M
LCCN
2005615385

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December 13, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
December 5, 2010 Edited by Open Library Bot Added subjects from MARC records.
December 10, 2009 Created by WorkBot add works page