Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation
Christine Jolls, National Bure...
Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation by Christine Jolls, National Bureau of Economic Research, Christine Jolls, National Bureau of Economic Research
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Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation

A longstanding puzzle in corporate finance is the rise of stock repurchases as a means of distributing earnings to shareholders. While most attempts to explain repurchase behavior focus on the incentives of firms, this paper focuses on the incentives of the agents who run firms, as determined by those agents' compensation packages. The increased use of repurchases coincided with an increasing reliance on stock options to compensate top managers, and stock options encourage managers to choose repurchases over conventional dividend payments because repurchases, unlike dividends, do not dilute the per-share value of the stock. Consistent with the stock option hypothesis, I find that firms which rely heavily on stock-option-based compensation are significantly more likely to repurchase their stock than firms which rely less heavily on stock options to compensate their top executives. I find no such relationship between repurchases and restricted stock, an alternative form of stock-based compensation that, unlike stock options, is not diluted by dividend payments. These findings have implications for the study of other puzzles concerning firms' payout behavior, and for the study of the effects of executive compensation packages on managerial incentives.

Publish Date
Language
English
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Cover of: Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation
Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation
1998, National Bureau of Economic Research
electronic resource in English

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March 1998.

Access restricted to subscribers.

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.

System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Cambridge, Mass
Series
NBER working paper series -- no. w6467, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- no. w6467

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[electronic resource]

Edition Identifiers

Open Library
OL62725017M

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Work ID
OL46191237W

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