Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation

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Optimal resource extraction contracts under t ...
Eduardo Engel
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Last edited by MARC Bot
December 22, 2020 | History

Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation

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"The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner's optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard, and the general thrust of the results described above is preserved"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Publish Date
Language
English

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Cover of: Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation
Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation
2008, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/11/2008.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Cambridge, MA
Series
NBER working paper series -- working paper 13742, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13742.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL17088896M
LCCN
2008612467

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Download catalog record: RDF / JSON
December 22, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
December 10, 2009 Created by WorkBot add works page