Commercial policy in a predatory world

Commercial policy in a predatory world
James E. Anderson, James E. An...
Commercial policy in a predatory world by James E. Anderson, James E. Anderson
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November 10, 2026 | History

Commercial policy in a predatory world

Predation -- extortion or theft -- imposes significant, sometimes prohibitive, costs on trade. Mutual causation of predation and trade can explain trade volume responses to liberalization that are otherwise puzzlingly 'too big' or 'too small'. Efficient commercial policy in this setting should subsidize (tax) trade when enforcement is weak (strong). The Mercantilist predilection for trade monopoly and for subsidy has a rationale. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is rational when enforcement is weak (strong). The switch from weak to strong enforcement explains the switch from tolerance to intolerance by British policy toward its North American colonies after 1763.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
34
Edition Availability
Cover of: Commercial policy in a predatory world
Commercial policy in a predatory world
2006, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"October 2006."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 27).

Published in
Cambridge, Mass
Series
NBER working paper series -- no. 12576., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 12576.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Pagination
34 p. :
Number of pages
34

Edition Identifiers

Open Library
OL17631619M
LCCN
2006619133
OCLC/WorldCat
75204151

Work Identifiers

Work ID
OL3396031W

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