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"Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their nondemocratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypotheses using both statistical analyses and historical case studies."--BOOK JACKET.
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Subjects
| Edition | Availability |
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1
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
2009, Cambridge University Press
in English
0511491654 9780511491658
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2
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
2005, Cambridge University Press
in English
0511031742 9780511031748
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3
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
2001, Cambridge University Press
in English
0511041225 9780511041228
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4
Democracy and coercive diplomacy
2001, Cambridge University Press
in English
0521792274 9780521792271
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Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
2001, Cambridge University Press
in English
0511047010 9780511047015
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references (p. 282-296) and index.

