The thesis traces Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World in general and Guinea and Somalia in particular from the end of World War II to the present, showing how the Soviets have attempted to use military and economic aid to gain influence in less developed countries (LDCs). It shows how LDCs normally only seek aid from the Soviet Union if they have been rebuffed by the industrialized West. The Soviet Union since World War II has gained only limited influence using military aid. They have further drastically decreased the amount of economic aid they provide to LDCs, and have become increasingly selective with regard to which nations receive their aid. The thesis further analyzes the modernizing strategies selected by Guinea and Somalia, at independence, and examines the effects of tradition on the success of these strategies. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the implications of Soviet foreign policy toward Guinea and Somalia on American policy toward Africa seeking to determine what national interests, if any, the United States has in Guinea and Somalia. (Author)