This thesis develops an optimization based model to assist the Navy Recruiting Command in placing Nuclear Power Field recruits in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). After signing enlistment contracts, individuals are enrolled in the DEP prior to entering recruit training. During DEP, some individuals may renege on their contracts, thus becoming DEP losses. Although DEP is costly, it is a necessary and important inventory management tool since it provides a pool of recruits to meet future accession goals. The DEP placement problem is formulated as a nonlinear program that minimizes relative recruiting costs weighted with respect to the desired recruit category. The lowest recruiting costs are assigned to recruits in DEP lengths that ensure the lowest probability of becoming a DEP loss. Increased costs are assigned to direct shippers. A large penalty cost is assigned to monthly accession deficits. Integral to the model are estimates of DEP loss probability for the various combinations of recruit categories and DEP lengths. This research concludes that the annual new contract objective (NCO) does not support the successful attainment of the accession goal. Furthermore, an NCO increase of 20% is required to achieve the accession goal with a 95% confidence level. Finally, the thesis addresses the accession goal confidence levels associated with incremental increases of the NCO.