Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto -or veto threat- has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
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Veto power: institutional design in the European Union
2011, University of Michigan Press
in English
0472117939 9780472117932
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Book Details
Table of Contents
Institutional design at IGCs
Case selection
Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism
Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism
Winners and losers at Amsterdam
Council votes and commissioners
Exit threats, veto rights, and integration
British accession : exit options and veto power.
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-178) and index.
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