"In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarked that "the philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness." Wittgenstein argued that many philosophical problems are not really problems at all, but rather pseudo-problems engendered by conceptual confusion. In his hands, seemingly intractable problems are not solved, but rather dissolved. In Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy Michael Hymers analyzes Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophical practice from his early, transitional, and later work, showing how they are indispensable for understanding his thought and, indeed, for coming to terms with philosophy as practiced today. According to Hymers, those remarks portray philosophical problems as confusions that result from an unclear view of the implicit norms that underlie our linguistic practices, and they portray philosophy as a practice of alleviating such confusions by making those implicit norms explicit. While this book is accessible to readers approaching Wittgenstein's work for the first time, it offers novel interpretations of Wittgenstein's thought that will be of interest to more experienced Wittgenstein students and scholars."--Jacket.