"In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria."--BOOK JACKET.
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United we stand?: divide-and-conquer politics and the logic of international hostility
2005, State University of New York Press
in English
0791463435 9780791463437
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Book Details
Table of Contents
Regime vulnerability and international conflict
Coup risk and military division : hostility within the armed forces and regime survival
A theory of counterbalancing as a cause of international conflict
Regime vulnerability, counterbalancing, and international conflict during the Cold War : a quantitative analysis / Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer
Regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970s
When dividing the military provides an incentive for conflict : fragmented military forces and international conflict in Shevardnadze's Georgia.
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-156) and index.
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