When the tern 'rational' is used in formal economic theory, a strict definition is implicit. This strict definition cannot accommodate the complexities of our everyday ideas of what is rational. The concept of rationality that is embedded in our language is not a morally neutral one. It has always been believed possible to argue rationally about the worthiness of goals, the legitimacy of claims to rights, the existence of obligations or duties.

Outside the discussions of the social sciences, argument concerning the rationality of a choice or action is never a purely technical, value-free discourse.

This book is devoted to an examination of the limitations of the various formulations and interpretations of the concept of rationality which has been developed by economic theorists. It presents a series of challenges to the formal (axiomatic) concept of rationality. This concept has spread from economics and decision theory through the social sciences and policy studies.

It forms the implicit foundation for the pronouncements of policy-makers, whose recommendations can seriously affect the society and environment in which we live.