This outstanding third volume in Rhea's analysis of the duel between U.S. Grant and Robert E. Lee in the summer of 1864 demonstrates the value of operational narrative: Rhea's conclusions depend heavily on his fingertip mastery of the details of some of the most confused fighting of the Civil War. This volume also shows that Grant and Lee, far from representing opposite poles of generalship, were remarkably alike. Both were aggressive; both were willing to attempt unorthodox operational maneuvers in quest of a tactical advantage that might lead to a decisive battle. Grant's goal was not to capture Richmond, but to destroy Lee's army. During the period covered here, as in the campaign's earlier stages, Grant kept Lee off balance with a series of feints and maneuvers that, as presented by Rhea (a practicing attorney), should discredit once and for all Grant's image as an unsophisticated grappler. He was frustrated by Lee's ability to match him thrust for thrust. Wherever Grant moved, Lee responded. By 1864 the combination of fieldworks and firepower had become sufficiently formidable on both sides to frustrate consistently what on maps seemed promising tactical opportunities. Even an outnumbered defense could hold positions long enough for support to arriveAafter which the attacker's valor and energy only increased casualty lists on both sides. The old Army of the Potomac and the old Army of Northern Virginia both died in May 1864, mutually eviscerated by a style of war that would harvest even more corpses to even less purpose on the European battlefields of 1914-1915.