This book compares the postwar planning conference of the Treasury, held at Bretton Woods, and the planning conference of the State Department, held at Dumbarton Oaks. While the two departments advocated similar goals of postwar economic prosperity and military security, they followed distinctly different strategies to achieve those goals.

At the Bretton Woods conference held in July 1944, the Treasury Department insisted that only states that could adhere to strict fiscal rules designed to increase the volume of international trade could join the newly created International Monetary Fund. At the Dumbarton Oaks conference held from August through October 1944, the State Department deliberately did not impose such prerequisites, but hoped to include all World War II Allies in the new collective security structure of the United Nations.

By comparing the two conferences, Dr. Schild presents a wide-ranging and authoritative account of Washington's intentions for the world that were to emerge following the defeat of the Axis powers.