Price coherence and excessive intermediation

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Price coherence and excessive intermediation
Benjamin Edelman
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Last edited by MARC Bot
August 8, 2024 | History

Price coherence and excessive intermediation

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Suppose an intermediary provides a benefit to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary's technology. We develop a model to show that the intermediary would want to restrict sellers from charging buyers more for transactions it intermediates. With this restriction an intermediary can profitably raise demand for its services by eliminating any extra price buyers face for purchasing through the intermediary. We show that this leads to inflated retail prices, excessive adoption of the intermediaries' services, over-investment in benefits to buyers, and a reduction in consumer surplus and sometimes welfare. Competition among intermediaries intensifies these problems by increasing the magnitude of their effects and broadening the circumstances in which they arise. We discuss applications to payment card systems, travel reservation systems, rebate services, and various other intermediaries.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
44

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Price coherence and excessive intermediation
Price coherence and excessive intermediation
2014, Harvard Business School
in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"October 2014" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-38, A18-A24, B30)

Published in
Boston]
Series
Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 15-030, Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 15-030

The Physical Object

Pagination
44, A24, B30 pages
Number of pages
44

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL53053741M
OCLC/WorldCat
895053087

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August 8, 2024 Created by MARC Bot Imported from harvard_bibliographic_metadata record