Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism

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Testing a purportedly more learnable auction ...
Katherine L. Milkman
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Last edited by MARC Bot
May 28, 2023 | History

Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism

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We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
37

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism
Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism
2008, Harvard Business School
in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"February 2008"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.

Published in
Boston]
Series
Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 08-064, Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 08-064

The Physical Object

Pagination
37 p.
Number of pages
37

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL48036752M
OCLC/WorldCat
219450397

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Download catalog record: RDF / JSON / OPDS | Wikipedia citation
May 28, 2023 Created by MARC Bot Imported from harvard_bibliographic_metadata record