Preference heterogeneity and optimal capital income taxation

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Preference heterogeneity and optimal capital ...
Mikhail Golosov
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Last edited by MARC Bot
January 4, 2023 | History

Preference heterogeneity and optimal capital income taxation

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We examine a prominent justification for capital income taxation: goods preferred by those with high ability ought to be taxed. In an environment where commodity taxes are allowed to be nonlinear functions of income and consumption, we derive an analytical expression that reveals the forces determining optimal commodity taxation. We then calibrate the model to evidence on the relationship between skills and preferences and extensively examine the quantitative case for taxes on future consumption (saving). In our baseline case of a unit intertemporal elasticity, optimal capital income tax rates are 2% on average and 4.5% on high earners. We find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has a substantial effect on optimal capital taxation. If the intertemporal elasticity is one-third, optimal capital income tax rates rise to 15% on average and 23% on high earners; if the intertemporal elasticity is two, optimal rates fall to 0.6% on average and 1.6% on high earners. Nevertheless, in all cases that we consider the welfare gains of using optimal capital taxes are small.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
36

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Preference heterogeneity and optimal capital income taxation
Cover of: Preference heterogeneity and optimal capital income taxation
Preference heterogeneity and optimal capital income taxation
2010, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"April 2011" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.

Published in
[Boston]
Series
Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 11-104, Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 11-104.

The Physical Object

Pagination
36 p.
Number of pages
36

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL45354169M
OCLC/WorldCat
723493675

Work Description

"We examine a prominent justification for capital income taxation: goods preferred by those with high ability ought to be taxed. In an environment where commodity taxes are allowed to be nonlinear functions of income and consumption, we derive an analytical expression that reveals the forces determining optimal commodity taxation. We then calibrate the model to evidence on the relationship between skills and preferences and extensively examine the quantitative case for taxes on future consumption (saving). In our baseline case of a unit intertemporal elasticity, optimal capital income tax rates are 2% on average and 4.5% on high earners. We find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has a substantial effect on optimal capital taxation. If the intertemporal elasticity is one-third, optimal capital income tax rates rise to 15% on average and 23% on high earners; if the intertemporal elasticity is two, optimal rates fall to 0.6% on average and 1.6% on high earners. Nevertheless, in all cases that we consider the welfare gains of using optimal capital taxes are small"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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January 4, 2023 Created by MARC Bot Imported from harvard_bibliographic_metadata record