This paper examines the current state of the Army's funding in relation to its needs as well as in relation to its historical proportion of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. DoD has traditionally allocated the Army approximately a quarter of the overall DoD budget, while the Navy and Air Force have received greater than 30 percent. These figures are roughly the same whether looking at the Reagan, Clinton, or either of the Bush Presidencies. Despite the heavy lifting done by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget request had the Army getting about 25 percent while the Navy and Air Force receive slightly less than 30 percent each. The FY2008 request submitted to Congress in February 2007 moved that mark to 27 percent for the Army, 28 percent for the Air Force, 29 percent for the Navy/Marine Corps, and 16 percent for other DoD programs. These overall percentages do not vary by more than 2 percent of the historical average over the last 30 years. Advocates for increased Defense spending have pointed out that defense spending, as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP), is at a historical low of 3-4 percent over the last 10 years, while opponents argue that the end of the Cold War and the limited war we are fighting now justify less of an investment in Defense. This year the Army's leadership is attempting to make a stronger argument for additional dollars, while simultaneously refusing to entertain the question of diverting money from Air Force and Navy funding streams. How did the Army get to the point where it is the perennial bronze medal winner in a three-man funding race? Are the Army's relations with Congress part of the problem in obtaining sufficient funding? How does DoD determine who gets what and how do they determine how much is enough? After examining the possible Army funding options, this paper concludes with recommendations of actions that the Army leadership should take to procure additional funding for the Army.