Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
by Philip Keefer
In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.
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Central Banks and banking, Inflation (Finance)Showing 1 featured edition. View all 1 editions?
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Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
2001, World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy
Electronic resource
in English
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Edition Notes
Also available in print.
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 19, 2002.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 6 revisions
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| December 7, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| August 4, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
| December 14, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| December 14, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |