This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action is concerned with deepening our understanding of intention and agency.

In Bratman's view when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility.

The essays offer extensive discussions of related views by, among others, Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castaneda, J. David Velleman, Christine Korsgaard, Harry Frankfurt, and P. F. Strawson. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students and will also be of interest to social and developmental psychologists, AI researchers, and game and decision theorists.