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"Corporate governance disasters could often be averted had directors asked CEOs questions, demanded answers, and blown whistles. Milgram (1974) reveals an innate psychological predisposition to obey authority. Such undesirable agentic behavior, dubbed a Type II agency problem, explains directors' acquiescence. Other work reveals dissenting peers, conflicting authorities, and distant authorities weakening such acquiescence. This justifies independent directors, non-executive chairs, and independent directors meeting without CEOs. Empirical evidence that such measures work is scant. This may reflect measurement problems, for apparently independent directors often have financial or personal ties to CEOs; or other behavioral factors that reinforce director subservience"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Behavioral finance in corporate governance: independent directors and non-executive chairs
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
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December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
August 4, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] :' to 'Electronic resource' |
December 12, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
October 31, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | add URIs from original MARC record |
April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |