This study makes extensive use of personal interviews and recently declassified U.S. government documents to cast fresh light on various aspects of American policy toward Nicaragua during the period from dictatorial to revolutionary rule. It concludes with a provocative argument rejecting the notion that there was a dramatic policy shift in the transition from Carter to Reagan. This is the first book to place U.S. policy during the Somoza crisis in a compelling and rigorous analytical framework.

American policy toward the crisis of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua centered on the goal of securing a change of regime that ensured the continuity of the existing state institutions, especially the National Guard. The Carter administration's willingness to dump Somoza after decades of U.S. support for the family dynasty was triggered by the appearance of a mass-based social movement led by radical nationalist guerrillas posing a challenge to both the regime and the state.

Determined to prevent a Sandinista-dominated victory over the dictatorship, the White House actively supported those sectors of the opposition movement perceived as most supportive of U.S. interests in Nicaragua and prepared to coexist with the Somoza state.

The failure to broker the desired outcome did not weaken the centrality of the state-regime distinction in American policy deliberations on Nicaragua. Rather, it testified to the fact that Washington is not omnipotent - it cannot assume that what it "wills" it can "realize".

In the absence of a viable alternative, the Carter administration adopted a policy of conditional accommodation with the new Sandinista-dominated regime and state, and began formulating strategies - political, economic, covert - to promote a political base within the regime that could eventually challenge the state.