Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals

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Optimal sanctions when the probability of app ...
Lucian A. Bebchuk
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Last edited by WorkBot
December 15, 2009 | History

Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals

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Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
11

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals
Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals
1992, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"May 1992."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 11).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Do doctoral students' financial support patterns affect their time-to-degree and completion probabilities.

Published in
Cambridge, MA (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge 02138)
Series
NBER working papers series -- working paper no. 4078, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 4078.

The Physical Object

Pagination
11 p. ;
Number of pages
11

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL22439186M

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History

Download catalog record: RDF / JSON / OPDS | Wikipedia citation
December 15, 2009 Edited by WorkBot link works
November 13, 2008 Created by ImportBot Imported from Binghamton University MARC record