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"This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
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Subjects
Disability Insurance, Disability insurancePlaces
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/21/2006.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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The Physical Object
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- Created October 19, 2008
- 5 revisions
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December 17, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
July 29, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
December 15, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
October 28, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | Found a matching Library of Congress MARC record |
October 19, 2008 | Created by ImportBot | Imported from Library of Congress MARC record |