Social reinforcement
cascades, entrapment and tipping
by G. M. Heal
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There are many social situations in which the actions of different agents reinforce each other. These include network effects and the threshold models used by sociologists (Granovetter, Watts) as well as Leibenstein's "bandwagon effects." We model such situations as a game with increasing differences, and show that tipping of equilibria as discussed by Schelling, cascading and Dixit's results on clubs with entrapment are natural consequences of this mutual reinforcement. If there are several equilibria, one of which Pareto dominates, then we show that the inefficient equilibria can be tipped to the efficient one, a result of interest in the context of coordination problems.
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Social reinforcement: cascades, entrapment and tipping
2007, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
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Edition Notes
"November 2007"
Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-18).
Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).
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- Created September 29, 2008
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| December 19, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
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| April 25, 2009 | Edited by ImportBot | add OCLC number |
| September 29, 2008 | Created by ImportBot | Imported from Oregon Libraries MARC record |