Jordan Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory.

In this volume of essays, Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an actions's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb Problems and the Prisoners' Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of causal world Bayesianism.

The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems, and studies ways in which perfectly rational causal maximizers can be capable of resolute choices. Several of the essays concern games, with interacting ideally rational and well-informed maximizing rationality. Sobel also views critically David Gauthier's revisionist ideas about maximizing rationality.

1. This collection will be a desideratum for anyone working in the field of rational choice theory, whether in philosophy, economics, political science, psychology, or statistics.