The beginnings of military strategy in all books upon the subject are passed over with a few general remarks. Students of the subject are not orientalists and their discussions begin with Greek sources. Although the present writer, it is needless to say, is totally without special knowledge of the subject, it has seemed to him that the most notable of the materials from the early Orient should be studied from this point of view, and made accessible to the student of military history. We shall never possess sufficient data on the wars of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria to build up a work like that of Kromayer on the battlefields of Greece, but the surviving materials, which carry our knowledge of military strategy a thousand years back of Greek times have never been employed for this purpose at all; and this essay is designed to furnish a beginning, at least, in the explanation of these materials. As it is hoped that this contribution may be used by many who are not orientalists, I must ask my fellow Egyptologists to excuse the translation and explanation of some things which, however obvious to them, must be made clear to those not familiar with Egyptian. For the same reasons I have also withheld almost all grammatical discussion. It should also be further said that the following essay does not intend to discuss the political aspects of this battle, either in the conditions which led up to it, or those which resulted from it. My purpose is only to make clear the military maneuvers involved in the battle. The exact method of deploying troops in action I have also not intended to discuss. It will be evident from the reliefs that well-disciplined battle lines were maintained, and that disorganized, hand-to-hand fighting resulted only when the enemy's lines were broken. This last question needs special investigation. - p. 81.