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When it was created in 1947, the CIA had a clear remit to prevent strategic surprises. On key occasions, it has failed spectacularly. How is this possible? Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. Constructing Cassandra analyzes four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The book traces the ultimate origin of these seemingly diverse surprises to the enduring collective identity and culture of the Agency itself.
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Subjects
Intelligence Analysis, CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11, Cuban Missile Crisis, Iranian Revolution, Collapse USSR, Strategic Surprise, Intelligence service, united states, United states, central intelligence agency, History, Intelligence service, United States. Central Intelligence Agency, United StatesPeople
Sherman Kent, John McCone, Nikita Khrushchev, Michael Scheuer, Fidel Castro, Osama bin Ladin, George Tenet, Robert GatesTimes
1947-2001Showing 1 featured edition. View all 1 editions?
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Constructing Cassandra Reframing Intelligence Failure At The CIA 19472001
2013, Stanford University Press, Stanford Security Studies
paperback
0804785805 9780804785808
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Feedback?November 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
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