MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02004cam 22003137a 4500
001 2005616344
003 DLC
005 20050127170452.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050127s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005616344
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBebchuk, Lucian A.
245 14 $aThe costs of entrenched boards$h[electronic resource] /$cLucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10587
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/27/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is overall affected by arrangements protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggered boards that substantially insulate the board from removal via a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically significant reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also find evidence consistent with staggered boards' bringing about, and not merely reflecting, a lower firm value. Finally, the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which can be amended by shareholders)"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aBoards of directors$xManagement.
650 0 $aGoing public (Securities)
700 1 $aCohen, Alma.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10587.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w10587