| Record ID | marc_oregon_summit_records/catalog_files/washs02192008.mrc_revrev.mrc:1925194001:1542 |
| Source | Oregon Libraries |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_oregon_summit_records/catalog_files/washs02192008.mrc_revrev.mrc:1925194001:1542?format=raw |
LEADER: 01542cam a2200385Ia 4500
001 173368271
003 OCoLC
005 20071130111708.0
007 cr mn|||||||||
008 070927s2007 mau b 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)173368271
040 $aUPM$cUPM$dGZM$dNTE
049 $aNTEA$aNTEF
090 $aHB1$b.W654 no.13372
100 1 $aEdmans, Alex.
245 12 $aA calibrative model of optimal CEO incentives in market equilibrium /$cAlex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2007.
300 $a50p. : ;$c22 cm.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 13372.
500 $a"September 2007."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 43-46).
530 $aAlso available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).
650 0 $aChief executive officers$xSalaries, etc.$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aDirectors of corporations$xSalaries, etc.$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aCorporate governance.
700 1 $aGabaix, Xavier.
700 1 $aLandier, Augustin.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;$vworking paper no. 13372.
856 41 $zOnline access for everyone$uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/W13372
907 $a.b34220501$bmulti$c-
902 $a071206
998 $b2$c071130$dm$ea$f-$g2
945 $lwhs $aHB1$b.W654 no.13372
945 $lt $aHB1$b.W654 no.13372 (Electronic resource)