| Record ID | marc_oapen/oapen.marc.utf8.mrc:5774072:2068 |
| Source | marc_oapen |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_oapen/oapen.marc.utf8.mrc:5774072:2068?format=raw |
LEADER: 02068 am a22004573u 450
001 1003253
005 20190110
007 cu#uuu---auuuu
008 190110s|||| xx o 0 u eng |
020 $a9783631527078
024 7 $a$2doi
041 0 $aeng
042 $adc
072 7 $aKFCX$2bicssc
072 7 $aKJMV1$2bicssc
100 1 $aSellhorn, Thorsten$4aut
245 10 $aGoodwill Impairment
260 $aBern$bPeter Lang International Academic Publishers$c20180928
300 $a350
520 $aIn 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with economic factors and managers? financial reporting objectives. Based on a systematic literature review, this study investigates for a comprehensive sample of US firms the determinants of goodwill write-off behavior. Regression analysis shows that write-off behavior is significantly explained by firms? economic properties. Only in large, high-profile firms, incentives appear to be significant determinants. These findings suggest that the impairment-only approach does capture goodwill impairment at least to some extent.
546 $aEnglish.
650 7 $aAccounting: study & revision guides$2bicssc
650 7 $aBudgeting & financial management$2bicssc
653 $aBilanzpolitik
653 $aEmpirical
653 $aFirmenwert
653 $aGenerally Accepted Accounting Principles
653 $aGeschäftswert
653 $aGoodwill
653 $aImpairment
653 $aInvestigation
653 $aOffs
653 $aSellhorn
653 $aSFAS
653 $aunder
653 $aUSA
653 $aUS-GAAP
653 $aWertberichtigung
653 $aWrite
856 40 $uhttp://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid=1003253$zAccess full text online
856 40 $uhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode$zCreative Commons License