MARC Record from marc_nuls

LEADER: 02307cam 2200373 i 4500
001 9925327279701661
005 20180330152034.7
008 170814t20182018mau b 001 0 eng c
010 $a 2017036330
020 $a9780674979604$qhardcover$qalkaline paper
020 $a0674979605$qhardcover$qalkaline paper
035 $a99978229361
035 $a(OCoLC)1006454473
035 $a(OCoLC)on1006454473
040 $aMH/DLC$beng$erda$cDLC$dOCLCO$dOCLCF$dYDX
042 $apcc
050 00 $aK1763$b.P56 2018
082 00 $a344.01$223
100 1 $aPiore, Michael J.,$eauthor.
245 10 $aRoot-cause regulation :$bprotecting work and workers in the twenty-first century /$cMichael J. Piore and Andrew Schrank.
264 1 $aCambridge, Massachusetts :$bHarvard University Press,$c2018.
264 4 $c℗♭2018
300 $axiv, 207 pages ;$c25 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
520 $aWhy does the United States assign responsibility for different aspects of labor and employment law (e.g., wages and hours, safety and health, collective bargaining, discrimination, etc.) to different agencies, when France, Spain, and their former colonies assign all aspects of labor and employment law to a single agency? Does the US approach, which essentially reduces to "one inspector per law," perform better or worse than the "Latin" model, which implies "one inspector per firm?" And what are the implications for the division of labor in the public sector more generally? Root-Cause Regulation addresses these questions by comparing the evolution of labor market regulation in developed and developing countries over the course of the past century. The results speak not only to the protection of work and workers in the twenty-first century but to the organization of the public sector more generally.--$cProvided by publisher.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aThe United States -- France -- Spain -- Latin American variants -- Managing discretion -- Developing guidelines.
650 0 $aLabor laws and legislation.
650 0 $aLabor inspection$xLaw and legislation.
700 1 $aSchrank, Andrew,$eauthor.
947 $hCIRCSTACKS$r31786103123748
980 $a99978229361