MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 03839nam a22003614a 4500
001 2011506346
003 DLC
005 20120302075503.0
008 120208s2011 pau b f000 0 eng c
010 $a 2011506346
020 $a1584874988
020 $a9781584874980
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn756763611
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dIXA$dFUG$dAFQ$dDLC
042 $apcc
043 $an-mx---
050 00 $aHV8161.A2$bG73 2011
100 1 $aGrayson, George W.,$d1938-
245 10 $aThreat posed by mounting vigilantism in Mexico /$cGeorge W. Grayson.
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c[2011]
300 $axii, 59 p. ;$c23 cm.
500 $a"September 2011."
500 $a"External Research Associate Program."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 46-51).
505 0 $aIntroduction -- Overview of the violence sweeping Mexico -- Changing the rules of the game -- Inability of citizens to influence elected officials -- Vigilante eruptions -- Trends in vigilantism -- Organized vigilante groups -- Addressing "community justice."
520 $aUntil the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children's weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico's barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the "live and let live" ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support.
530 $aAlso available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
650 0 $aVigilantes$zMexico.
650 0 $aVigilance committees$zMexico.
650 0 $aOrganized crime$zMexico.
650 0 $aDrug traffic$zMexico.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
856 41 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1082