MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02467nam a22003257a 4500
001 2010655624
003 DLC
005 20110412172139.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110412s2011 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2010655624
040 $aDLC$cDLC
042 $apcc
043 $aa-ja---
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aRamseyer, J. Mark,$d1954-
245 10 $aDo school cliques dominate Japanese bureaucracies? :$bevidence from supreme court appointments$h[electronic resource] /$cJ. Mark Ramseyer.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2011]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 687
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 4/12/2011.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Abstract: Scholars (e.g., Chalmers Johnson) routinely argue that university cliques dominate Japanese firms and bureaucracies. The graduates of the most selective schools, they explain, control and manipulate their employer. They cause it to hire from their alma mater. They skew internal career dynamics to favor themselves. For most firms and bureaucracies, we lack the data on employee-level output necessary to test whether cliques do skew career tournaments. Because judges publish opinions, within the courts we may have what we need. In this article, I use data on published opinions to test whether Japanese judges from the most selective schools are more likely -- holding output constant -- to reach the Supreme Court. They are not. I find only weak evidence of possible favoritism toward Kyoto University graduates, and no evidence of favoritism toward Tokyo University graduates. Japanese judges do not find themselves named to the Court because of their school backgrounds. They find themselves named there because they are unusually productive"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
530 $aAlso available in print.
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
650 0 $aJudges$zJapan$xSelection and appointment.
650 0 $aCliques (Sociology)$xEconomic aspects$zJapan.
610 10 $aJapan.$bSaikō Saibansho.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 687.
856 40 $zView the PDF version of the paper at the School's website$uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin%5Fcenter/papers/687%5FRamseyer.php