MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01979nam a22002897a 4500
001 2008612467
003 DLC
005 20080813102141.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 080611s2008 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2008612467
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aEngel, Eduardo.
245 10 $aOptimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation$h[electronic resource] /$cEduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2008.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 13742
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 6/11/2008.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner's optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard, and the general thrust of the results described above is preserved"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aFischer, Ronald D.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 13742.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w13742