MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01922nam a22002897a 4500
001 2007615655
003 DLC
005 20070319133325.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 070319s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007615655
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aBebchuk, Lucian A.
245 10 $aOne-sided contracts in competitive consumer markets$h[electronic resource] /$cLucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2005]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 534
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/19/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper shows that "one-sided" terms in standard contracts, which deny consumers a contractual benefit that seems efficient on average, may arise in competitive markets without informational problems (other than those of courts). A onesided term might be an efficient response to situations in which courts cannot perfectly observe all the contingencies needed for an accurate implementation of a "balanced" contractual term when firms are more concerned about their reputation, and thus less inclined to behave opportunistically, than consumers are. We develop this explanation, discuss its positive and normative implications, and compare them to those of informationbasedexplanations for one-sided terms"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
700 1 $aPosner, Richard A.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 534.
856 40 $uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/534_Bebchuk_et%20al.php